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ARGUMENT 
V : filers i lot addressed in this Reply Brief, I PG relies upon his 
Opening Brief. 
* Overview 
• .:u .. : . ;,. :.i . icr nis whole life, during a psychotic, 
delusional state, caused the death oi ? : *MI i. common 
law, due to his psychosis, LPG almost certainly would i;ui have been held criminalism 
. -p :r course, woi lid not have meant I PG would have been set free; just 
that he would be confined in ihr |v<\ chiaii it hospital so Imig as he was found to suffer 
from., mental illness and dangerous. 
111; ill, like many other states, has modified the traditional common law rule to 
make it more restruliw 1 'lah'1 h/sim iii>ir. ;nc more se\cre than most other states, 
however, because it has limited the not guilty by reason of msamh ( N( ik I I jii'l-'iiiciil in 
:- aie cases to situations where the defendant did not kilow tlle victim was human. 
U.C.A. ^ '-*»» < ;, ^ ,. »^- f •. -> : ui. !™>M 
1 ?ij ^^ as originally charged \<\un n ' , i 
pursuant to 'he advice of his then counsel, Mr Stephen McCaughey, he entered into a 
pk^auver •'* . i . . . >. .. •• manslaughter and theft, and NGRI to 
a new charge of aggravated burglary with a deadly weapoi 1 ei lhai icel i lent. 
R.6-7, Add.1-2. IIK, "Add. " designations ;iu I Iln \ddenduni In I P( j's opening 
brief. 
- 1 . 
During the sentencing phase, in early 2004, and well before the sentencing 
hearing, due to Food and Drug Administration proceedings, LPG found out the 
psychiatric drugs he was given are known to cause psychosis in some people, including 
extreme violence. He brought this to the attention of Mr. McCaughey and after Mr. 
McCaughey failed to act upon it, LPG brought it directly to the trial court's attention.2 
LPG, but not Mr. McCaughey, (a) moved for an offense reduction under U.C.A. §76-3-
402 and requested the impending sentencing hearing be continued "to decide what to do 
about this new information,"3 and (b) presented the information regarding the iatrogenic 
cause of his psychosis in support of sentencing that: 
be structured that if and when, but only if and when, I am found safe for a 
conditional release or discharge by the hospital and authorized by the 
Court, that such conditional release or discharge will be possible.4 
Since it became apparent Mr. McCaughey was not going to do anything on LPG's behalf 
at sentencing, Mr. Mcaughey was discharged by LPG and asked to withdraw as counsel,5 
which Mr. McCaughey did unconditionally.6 
However, at the sentencing hearing, neither the trial court nor Mr. McCaughey 
even acknowledged his discharge and withdrawal, essentially acting as if they had never 
2
 R.523, Add.52. 
3
 Id. 
4
 R. 526, Add.54. 
5R.531,Add.59. 
6
 R.532, Add.60. 
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occurred. All Mr. McCaughey did at the sentencing hearing was characterize the 
o 
offense reduction motion "frivolous." 
The trial court, hearing no argument in favor of the offense reduction motion, nor 
any argument for any kind of consideration in sentencing on LPG's behalf, sentenced 
LPG to one to fifteen years for each offense to run consecutively, plus one to five years 
for the weapon enhancement,9 which was the maximum available. Because of the way 
the disposition on the NGRI interacts with the GMI convictions, LPG does not receive 
the benefit of the NGRI disposition that would permit a discharge, conditional or 
otherwise, when it is determined (if ever) it is safe to do so, nor does he receive the 
benefit of the term setting process for the GMI convictions under Utah's indeterminate 
sentencing system because of the NGRI disposition. 
These facts create a host of legal infirmities with the trial court proceedings. Two 
of these are per se violations of the constitutional right to counsel requiring reversal 
without a showing of prejudice. 
First, Mr. McCaughey?s disloyalty at sentencing by characterizing the offense 
reduction motion "frivolous," without more, invalidates the entire proceeding including 
the GMI and NGRI judgments because it is disloyalty per se.10 Second, as very recently 
held by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, U.S. , 
7
 R. 609. 
8
 R.609:4-5, Add. 119-20. 
9
 R609, Add. 116-124; R538, Add. 125 
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126 S.Ct. 2557 (2006), LPG had an absolute right to the non-appointed attorney of his 
choice, and the failure to honor that right during the sentencing phase is a structural 
defect mandating reversal and remand. 
With respect to the former, as was set forth in LPG's opening brief and will also be 
discussed below, whether or not LPG moved to withdraw the guilty plea before sentence 
was announced is irrelevant. Attorney disloyalty invalidates the proceeding. However, 
even leaving aside the disloyalty in terming the offense reduction motion "frivolous," the 
absolute failure of Mr. McCaughey to do anything on LPG's behalf during the sentencing 
phase is ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law. 
There are absolutely no facts in the record to support the aggravated burglary 
judgment because LPG was in the family home with permission. Under U.C.A. §76-2-
305(a) and Herrera, only if the perpetrator did not know the victim was human can a 
homicide result in a not guilty by reason of insanity judgment. Under the extraordinary 
facts in Herrera the perpetrator was found to be legally insane when he killed one victim, 
thinking she was a robot and not legally insane when he attempted to kill other victims. 
Here, there was no explanation of how LPG could be NGRI of the aggravated burglary 
and guilty of the manslaughter. These points were made in LPG's opening brief, yet the 
State totally ignored them in its brief, presumably because it could not address them.11 
(Continued footnote) 
10
 See, LPG's opening brief, pp 13-16, including its citation to Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 
F.2d 612, 625 (CA10 1988) that terming the offense reduction motion frivolous is zper 
se violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
11
 Because the State failed to even attempt to rebut this, it will not be addressed further in 
this reply brief. 
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Finally, under the facts of this case, it is illegal for LPG to have been convicted for 
manslaughter and acquitted as not guilty by reason of insanity for aggravated burglary 
because the two crimes merge as a part of one continuous course of conduct/lesser 
included offense under U.C.A. §76-1-402(1); State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah 1985); 
and State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236 (Utah 1997).12 
II. The Trial Court's Failure to Honor LPGfs Discharge of Mr. McCaughey 
was A Structural Defect Requiring Reversal. 
§V of LPG's Opening Brief, discusses how it was reversible error for the trial 
court to fail to address LPG's discharge of Mr. McCaughey, his retained counsel, and 
proceeding with the sentencing as if he had not been discharged. In response, the State 
makes two arguments: (1) Mr. McCaughey was retained, not appointed counsel, and (2) 
the error was harmless. 
On June 26, 2006, in Gonzalez-Lopez, the United States Supreme Court 
definitively addressed both contentions by holding a criminal defendant has the absolute 
right to choose his own non-appointed counsel and a violation of such right is a 
"structural defect" requiring reversal without any additional showing of harm or 
prejudice. Gonzalez-Lopez is both controlling and dispositive here. 
Even though it is not required, LPG was also clearly prejudiced. 
First, prejudice has been established because the result was LPG's right to move to 
withdraw the guilty plea was improperly cut off. The State, at 34-35, argues this did not 
12
 This issue is addressed for the first time here, but for the reasons stated in Section IX 
LPG believes it is necessary to do so. 
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demonstrate any prejudice, because there was ,fnothing in the record [that] supports 
defendant's allegation that he wanted to withdraw his guilty [plea] before sentencing." 
However, as set forth at page 30 of LPG's brief, he specifically requested "some time to 
sort out what should be done about [finding out his psychosis was likely treatment 
caused]." Not having a chance to discuss his options with new counsel was clearly 
prejudicial because LPG is now faced with the entire jurisdiction question about 
ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the GMI pleas because he did not move 
to withdraw the guilty pleas.13 
A second way LPG was prejudiced is Mr. McCaughey's sabotaging of the offense 
reduction motion. As will be discussed below, whether or not LPG's psychosis was 
iatrogenic (treatment caused) is extremely relevant to the merits of the offense reduction 
motion as well as for the sentencing decisions. The trial court's leaving Mr. McCaughey 
in place deprived LPG from having the analysis of why the iatrogenic nature of LPG's 
psychosis warranted the trial court granting the offense reduction motion presented at the 
sentencing hearing. This was clear prejudice. 
In addition, LPG was prejudiced because Mr. McCaughey did absolutely nothing 
on LPG's behalf during the sentencing phase. As a result, LPG received the absolute 
maximum confinement possible under the plea agreement. 
13
 In its November 25, 2005 Order, this Court denied LPG's Rule 23B remand motion 
with respect to the guilty pleas because of the failure to move to withdraw, so prejudice is 
established with respect to the Rule 23B remand motion as well. 
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In sum, even though dishonoring LPG's right to choose his non-appointed counsel 
is a structural defect which must be reversed under Gonzalez-Lopez without showing of 
prejudice, LPG was prejudiced. 
III. This Court Has Jurisdiction to Consider the Disloyalty Claim 
In §1 of the Argument in his Opening Brief, LPG cited to United States Supreme 
Court, Utah Supreme Court, and 10th Circuit Court of Appeals cases, all of which are 
controlling, that attorney disloyalty renders a conviction invalid without consideration of 
any other factor, such as the necessity of moving to withdraw a guilty plea.14 The State 
failed to address any of these cases. 
While the U.S. Supreme Court in Gonzalez-Lopez did not specifically state that 
attorney disloyalty is the same sort of "structural defect" as denial of the right to choose 
retained counsel, it is clear it is because,"[it] affect[s] the framework within which the 
trial proceeds, and [is] not 'simply an error in the trial process itself.'". Id, at 2564. The 
same sort of language was used in the cases holding attorney disloyalty constitutes a per 
se constitutional defect cited in §V of LPG's Opening Brief. For example, in United 
States v. Cronic, 466 US 648, 656-7, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2045-6 (1984), the United States 
Supreme Court held that in the case of attorney disloyalty, "the process loses its character 
as a confrontation between adversaries, [and] the constitutional guarantee is violated." 
14
 United States v. Cronic, 466 US 648, 656-7, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2045-6 (1984); Glasser v. 
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76, 62 S.Ct. 457, 467-68 (1942); State v. Holland, 876 
P.2d, 357, 361 (Utah 1994); Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283 (CA10, 2002); mdOsborn 
v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 625 (CA 10 1988). 
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Attorney disloyalty renders a conviction invalid. No motion to withdraw the guilty 
plea is required in the face of attorney disloyalty. The disloyalty renders the conviction 
invalid. The state did not address this. 
IV.This Court Has Jurisdiction to Consider Whether the Not Guilty By Reason 
of Insanity Stipulated Judgment Was the Result of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel 
On page 21 of his Opening Brief, LPG points out that a not guilty by reason of 
insanity stipulated judgment is not a guilty plea to which either U.C.A. §77-13-6 or State 
v. Merrill 2005 UT 34, 114 P.3d 585 apply.15 The State, on page 16 of its brief, 
concedes this, but argues a jurisdictional bar against considering ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims for guilty convictions absent a motion to withdraw the guilty plea divests 
this Court of jurisdiction over the NGRI plea. This can not be. The State certainly cites 
no authority for the proposition that lack of jurisdiction for one appeal point divests this 
Court of jurisdiction of an appeal point this Court does have jurisdiction over. 
As set forth in LPG's Opening Brief, because this court does have jurisdiction over 
the NGRI plea, the question is whether this allows the Court to consider the related 
claims regarding the guilty plea. This is akin pendent jurisdiction. This principle was 
acknowledged by Chief Justice Crockett in State v. Robinson, 23 Utah 2d 78, 80 457 P.2d 
969, 969 (Utah 1969): 
15
 As also pointed out, in its November 25, 2005, Order in this case, this Court ruled" we 
do not determine what effect, if any, Merrill would have on the stipulation for entry of a 
not guilty by reason of insanity judgment on the aggravated burglary count, which was 
contained in the plea agreement." 
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When a case is before this court on a proper constitutional ground, 
the court should review whatever other assignments of error it thinks the 
interests of justice require. [FN6] 
FN6. The powers of this court in such circumstances 
are not unlike that labeled as 'pendent' jurisdiction in the 
Federal Courts. 
The State failed to address this. 
V. Mr. McCaughey Provided Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Sentencing 
The State admits Mr. McCaughey did nothing on LPG's behalf during the 
sentencing phase, justifying it on the ground the plea agreement was such a good deal.16 
However, counsel clearly also had an obligation to represent LPG at the sentencing 
phase, making the State's argument a tacit admission of ineffectiveness. There was much 
Mr. McCaughey should have done. 
For example, at the sentencing hearing, the State declared defendant's mental 
1 7 
illness "did not lessen his culpability." This was an improper argument by the 
prosecutor, and that it failed to even draw a response from Mr. McCaughey demonstrates 
his ineffectiveness. As Justice Stewart stated in his concurrence in State v. Young, 853 
P.2d 327, 419, n. 1 (Utah 1993), there are two types of culpability, legal culpability, 
which determines whether someone is to be held criminally accountable at all, and moral 
culpability, where mitigating circumstances, such as mental illness, come in to play to 
potentially reduce the penalty. 
State's Brief, pp 20-26. 
Add.l20,R.609:5. 
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Most importantly, the iatrogenic (treatment caused) nature of LPGfs psychosis was 
a huge mitigating circumstance that should have been pressed at sentencing. 
In addition, Ms. Gustin, Mr. McCaughey's co-counsel, stated in her motion to 
withdraw that "Steve McCaughey and Ms. Gustin cannot not adequately represent 
1 O 
Leonard Gall, Jr." This statement by co-counsel can not be ignored. 
VLThe Court Erred in Failing to Consider the Iatrogenic Nature of LPG's 
Psychosis and Reduce the Sentence. 
The State asserts the trial court considered the treatment caused nature of LPG's 
psychosis resulting in the tragedy, but could only point to the trial court's statement that it 
had "received and reviewed 15 letters, as well as numerous documents concerning mental 
health issues with regard to the defendant."19 This is ambiguous at best and since the trial 
court never even mentioned the iatrogenic (treatment caused) nature of the homicide it 
would be gross speculation to conclude that it considered this factor. Moreover it is clear 
the only factor that played any part in the trial court's decision to deny the offense 
reduction motion was "This was a crime of extreme violence and a 402 reduction is 
simply out of the question in this case." 
To hold, as the state asserts, that the "general rule" in State v. Helms, 40 P.3d 626, 
2002 UT 1, f 8 & 112 that the trial court is upheld "even if it failed to make findings on 
the record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such 
findings," applies in this case is to render meaningless the other core Helms holding that, 
18
 R.535, also reproduced as the sole addendum to this brief. 
19
 P. 31 of State's Brief, R.609:5. 
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"A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing when . . . it 'fails to consider all legally 
relevant factors.m In Helms the trial court found it was reasonable to assume the proper 
considerations had been taken into account because the trial court stated, "the court has 
gone over this presentence report rather carefully, and read it, and what has taken place." 
Under Helms the sentencing is not upheld if there are any grounds, to do so, but 
rather if it is "reasonable to assume" the trial court actually considered, "all legally 
relevant factors." Here, just the opposite occurred; the trial court specifically stated its 
reason for denying the sentence reduction motion was because it "was a crime of extreme 
violence." Thus, it is not reasonable to assume the court actually considered the 
treatment caused nature of LPG's psychosis. 
Moreover, Helms, at 1J12, held where the brevity of the sentencing order and the 
facts surrounding it are sufficiently ambiguous, the assumption that all legally relevant 
factors were considered should not be made. That is exactly the case here. LPG, but not 
Mr. McCaughey, made a very compelling showing that he was less morally culpable 
because his psychosis was caused by his treatment. He submitted reports by a very 
knowledgeable psychiatrist, Grace E. Jackson, MD, and Ph.D., psychologist, Ann Blake 
Tracy that this was very likely the case. This demanded specific attention from the trial 
court, which it did not receive. 
The State argues at page 31 of its brief that LPG's claim that "his mental illness is 
iatrogenically induced does not distinguish him from any other mentally ill offender. Nor 
(Continued footnote) 
20
 R609-6, Add. 121. 
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does it lessen his culpability." Here again, the State fails to distinguish moral culpability 
from legal culpability. It absolutely lessens LPG's moral culpability if his crime was the 
result of the psychiatric treatment he was given. This goes directly to the "history and 
character" of LPG, and is a factor the trial court was required to consider under U.C.A. 
§76-3-402(1). Under the circumstances of this case it is simply not "reasonable to 
assume" it was considered. 
VII. The Court Should Address the Illegal Incarceration Regime As Applied to 
LPG in This Case. 
At page 36, the State's Brief suggests this Court should not consider the illegal 
nature of LPG's incarceration regime because LPG did not present the reasons in his 
opening brief to justify considering issues first raised on appeal, citing to State v. Dean, 
2004 UT 63, ^ 13, 95 P.3d 276, (citing to State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^[11, 20 P.3d 
346); and State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, f45, 114 P.3d 551. However, LPG did present 
such reasons for both the constitutional and Americans with Disabilities Act arguments at 
pp 3 and 4 of his brief. The State complains this is insufficient under State v. Norris, 
2004 UT App 452, [^6, n.2 (unpublished memorandum decision), but Norris involved 
plain error, while here the justification for failure to preserve the issue below is 
ineffective assistance of counsel. As LPG stated in his Opening Brief, "The party may 
also assert ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve the issue, citing to State 
v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, ^[21, fn2, 61 P.3d 1062. Under Hansen, if an issue was not 
preserved due to ineffective assistance of counsel, it may be raised on appeal. 
-12-
VIII. The State Essentially Admits LPGys Analysis of the Discriminatory Effect 
of the NGRI and GMI Dispositions. 
The State's substantive argument, is similarly not well taken. At page 37, the State 
asserts LPG's argument is erroneous because it is "based on the [incorrect] premise that 
he must serve thirty years in the State Hospital before he can be considered for release." 
However, this is a misstatement of LPG's argument. What LPG actually argued is: 
However, it appears the Board of Pardons will not even set his term while 
he is at the hospital on the NGRI disposition. At the same time, the 
hospital can not even consider LPG for release under the NGRI disposition 
until he serves his sentence, which not having been set, is 30 years. Thus, 
solely by virtue of his NGRI status his prison sentence is, in effect, 
9 1 
increased from a baseline of 4 years and 6.4 months to 30 years. 
The State admits this is true at page 22 of its brief 
If defendant becomes stable enough to be released from the State Hospital 
within thirty years, then he will be transferred to the State Prison to serve 
the remainder of his sentence as determined by the Board of Pardons. 
In other words, so long as LPG is at the State Hospital serving his GMI sentences the 
Board of Pardons will not set his term. This can go on for 30 years, even though his 
baseline term for the GMI sentences under the Matrix is 4 years and 6.4 months.22 
As set forth in LPG's opening brief, this is in stark contrast to someone committed 
to the State Prison, where their term will be decided "as soon as practicable."23 This 
disparity is solely a result of his mental illness designation and, as set forth in LPG's 
LPG's Opening Brief, p. 36, emphasis in original. 
The State does not dispute this baseline term analysis. 
U.A.C. §R671-201. 
-13-
opening brief, is a violation of both the Equal Protection Clause and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act. 
The unconstitutionality arises as applied to LPG because the combination of 
dispositions deprives LPG of his rights under both Utah's indeterminate sentencing 
system and NGRI regime. LPG is committed to the State Hospital on the NGRI for from 
5 years to life and at the same time 2 to 30 years on the GMI sentences. As set forth in 
LPG's Opening Brief, the baseline term for the GMI sentences under the "Matrix" is four 
years and 6.4 months. If LPG was in the State Prison on the GMI judgments, this is the 
amount of time, plus or minus, he would be facing. 
Similarly, if LPG was at the State Hospital solely on the NGRI, the hospital could 
consider changing LPG's status based on therapeutic and treatment factors and could 
consider him for release (conditional or otherwise) after five years. However, so long as 
he is also serving his prison term while at the State Hospital, they do not have that option. 
Being committed to the State Hospital on his NGRI disposition prevents LPG from 
receiving the benefit of Utah's indeterminate sentencing system and this in turn prevents 
him from receiving the benefit of Utah's NGRI disposition regime. This is very 
analogous to State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244 (Utah 1995), where the Utah Supreme 
Court held a sentencing decision that did not allow the Board of Pardons to exercise the 
discretion intended in Utah's indeterminate sentencing system rendered the sentencing 
decision improper. 
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IX. The NGRI Acquittal on the Aggravated Burglary Charge Precludes 
Conviction of Manslaughter. 
After careful consideration, LPG believes he must also draw the Court's attention 
to the additional plain error that the NGRI disposition on the aggravated burglary charge 
violates U.C.A. §76-1-402(1) as interpreted by Bradley and Ross. This was not raised 
below, nor precisely in the way here, in LPG's opening brief.24 Under Appellate Rule 
24(c) and Romrell v. Zions First National Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 1980), matters 
not raised in the opening brief are not normally considered, but the court nevertheless "in 
its discretion, may decide a case upon any points that its proper disposition may require, 
even if first raised in a reply brief." In Romrell the Utah Supreme Court found the failure 
to make requisite findings warranted reversal even though it was raised for the first time 
in the reply brief. 
Here, LPG believes Gonzalez-Lopez is dispositive and the other points he has 
raised are meritorious and therefore this Court does not need to reach the issue. 
However, should this Court disagree, the failure to raise it now will most likely lead to a 
legitimate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in this appeal, to be pursued at the 
post conviction relief stage and, if unsuccessful, through habeas corpus proceedings. 
The defect with regard to the dispositions is that under the facts of this case, the 
manslaughter is a lesser included offense of the aggravated burglary. LPG was acquitted 
Even though this precise formulation of the lesser included offense/merger problem 
with the interplay between the NGRI and GMI dispositions was not raised in LPG's 
opening brief, the fundamental inconsistency of the dispositions was raised in §11. A., of 
LPG's brief in connection with the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
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(by reason of insanity) of the aggravated burglary and because the two crimes merge as a 
part of one continuous course of conduct/lesser included offense under U.C.A. §76-1-
402(1), Bradley, and Ross, it is illegal for him to have been convicted and punished for 
the manslaughter. In Bradley, the Utah Supreme Court held that aggravated assault was a 
lesser included offense of aggravated burglary. The same analysis under the facts here 
reveal that the manslaughter is a lesser included offense of the aggravated burglary. 
Here LPG was acquitted of the greater offense, aggravated burglary, by reason of 
insanity, and under U.C.A. §76-1-402(1) his conviction for the lesser offense of 
manslaughter can not stand. This is plain error and this Court has discretion to decide 
the case on this basis. Because LPG was acquitted on the aggravated burglary charge by 
reason of insanity (and committed to the State Hospital for up to life, therefor), the guilty 
and mentally ill conviction on the manslaughter charge should be vacated. 
Because the precise formulation of the problem with the not guilty by reason of 
insanity acquittal for the aggravated burglary and conviction on manslaughter being a 
violation of U.C.A. §76-1-402(1) was not raised previously, it does seem the State 
should be given an opportunity to address it and LPG certainly does not object to it 
submitting a supplemental brief on this issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant/Appellant Leonard Preston Gall respectfully 
requests this Court to: 
A. Vacate the Guilty and Mentally 111 on the manslaughter charge for violating 
U.C.A. §76-1-402(1); or 
B. In the alternative, Vacate the Judgments in this matter because of attorney 
disloyalty and remand for further proceedings; or 
C. In the alternative: 
(1) Vacate the Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity Judgment for lack of 
any factual basis; or 
(2) Vacate the Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity Judgment due to 
attorney disloyalty/ineffective assistance of counsel; 
(3) Vacate the sentences in this matter and remand for sentencing 
proceedings consistent with the decision of this Court; or 
D. In the further alternative, 
(1) Declare the incarceration regime under the judgments in this case 
unconstitutional as a violation(s) of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the United States Constitution and/or the Uniform Application 
provision of the Utah Constitution as applied to Defendant; and/or 
(2) Declare the incarceration regime under the judgments in this case a 
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 74__ day of J c/A/ 2006. 
LAW PROJECT FOR PSYCHIATRIC RIGHTS, INC. 
s B. Gottstein, Esq. 
Bar No. 7811100 
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